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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of two Jersey 
City "holiday" displays. The first, which featured a menorah 
and a Christmas tree, was annually placed in front of City 
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Hall for several decades.  In 1995, the District Court 
permanently enjoined the City from continuing the practice 
of erecting this or any substantially similar display, see ACLU 
of N.J. v. Schundler, 931 F.Supp. 1180 (D.N.J. 1995), and a 
prior panel of our court affirmed that decision.  ACLU of N.J. 
v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1444-50 (1997).  Jersey City 
subsequently moved for relief from that order under Rule 60 
(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that 
the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997),  had 
undermined the panel's reasoning.  The District Court denied 
this motion, and we now affirm that decision.  
 
Jersey City also challenges the District Court's most recent 
decision regarding a modified holiday display that the City 
put up after the original display was enjoined.  The modified 
display contained not only a creche, a menorah, and 
Christmas tree, but also large plastic figures of Santa Claus 
and Frosty the Snowman, a red sled, and Kwanzaa symbols 
on the tree.  In addition, the display contained two signs 
stating that the display was one of a series of displays put up 
by the City throughout the year to celebrate its residents' 
cultural and ethnic diversity.   We find this modified display 
to be indistinguishable in any constitutionally significant 
respect from the displays upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and County of 
Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
(hereinafter "Allegheny County"), and we therefore hold that 
Jersey City's modified display is likewise constitutional. 
 
I.   
 
From at least 1965 until 1995, the City of Jersey City 
commemorated the winter holiday season by displaying a 
creche and a menorah on city property in front of City Hall.  
The creche and menorah were owned, maintained, and stored 
by the City.  The creche, which was displayed during the 
period preceding and following Christmas, included a manger 
that measured 11' 9" by 7' by 4' 4".  It also included figures 
of Mary, Joseph, the Baby Jesus, and the Three Wise Men; 
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these varied in height from 12" to 27".  Surrounded by a post- 
rail fence, the creche was placed on the right side of City 
Hall.  The menorah, measuring 19' by 14', was displayed 
during Chanukah on the left side of City Hall.  (Also on the 
left-side of the lawn was a 13' Christmas tree, but this 
apparently escaped the District Court's attention.1)  Because 
the date of Chanukah generally falls near that of Christmas, 
the creche and menorah were usually displayed 
simultaneously, but in 1994, when the plaintiffs commenced 
this suit, Chanukah began unusually early, on November 28, 
and therefore the menorah was taken down shortly before the 
creche went up.2 
 
When Jersey City erected its traditional display in 1994, 
the American Civil Liberties Union sent the City a letter 
asking it to discontinue its practice of displaying religious 
symbols on public property.  In response, the City placed a 
sign adjacent to the display stating: "Through this display 
and others throughout the year, the City of Jersey City is 
pleased to celebrate the diverse cultural and ethnic heritages 
of its peoples."   Jersey City maintains that the sign's 
reference to other events refers to, among other things, the 
City's annual commemoration of Ramadan, the annual Grand 
Phagwah Parade held to celebrate the Hindu New Year, and 
a wide variety of cultural events related to the many diverse 
ethnic groups in the City.   
 
On December 21, 1994, the ACLU and other plaintiffs filed 
a complaint in state court against the City, the mayor, and 
the city council (hereinafter collectively "the City"), 
challenging the City's display under the federal and state 
constitutions.3  In January 1995, the City removed the action 
to the District Court, and on November 28, 1995, the District 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See 104 F.3d at 1438 n.1. 
2. According to the City, such an anomaly will not recur until 2014.  
3. Neither side has argued in this appeal that the state constitution  
imposes tighter restrictions than the federal Constitution.  Therefore,  
for purposes of this litigation we treat the two bodies of law  
as coextensive. See ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1446 n.11. 
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Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
and held that the City's display violated the Establishment 
Clause of the federal Constitution, as well as a parallel state 
constitutional provision.  The District Court permanently 
enjoined the City from erecting its traditional display or any 
substantially similar scene or display at the front entrance of 
City Hall or on other property that the City owned, 
maintained, or controlled.  
 
The City announced that it would appeal the decision, but 
in the meantime, on December 13, 1995, it erected a modified 
display that included, in addition to the elements in the 
previous display, a 4' tall plastic figure of Santa Claus, a 3' 
10" tall plastic figure of Frosty the Snowman, a 4' tall sled, 
Kwanzaa symbols on the tree, and two signs, each 
approximately 2' by 3', stating: "Through this display and 
others throughout the year, the City of Jersey City is pleased 
to celebrate the diverse cultural and ethnic heritages of its 
peoples."  See Appendix A (display on left side of City Hall); 
Appendix B (display on right side of City Hall); Appendix C 
(map of display). 
 
The plaintiffs then moved to have the City held in contempt 
of the District Court's injunction, and they also sought a 
preliminary injunction against the modified display.  On 
December 18, the District Court denied these requests, 
concluding that the addition of the secular symbols rendered 
the modified display constitutionally unobjectionable.  Ruling 
quickly, the District Court did not analyze the modified 
display at length but wrote: 
 
     I conclude that by making these additions defendants 
     have sufficiently demystified the [holy], they have 
     sufficiently desanctified sacred symbols, and they have 
     sufficiently deconsecrated the sacred to escape the 
     confines of the injunctive order in this case.  
 
On appeal, a panel of our court affirmed the District 
Court's decision regarding the original display.  104 F.3d at 
1444-50.  The panel noted the religious significance of the 
creche and the menorah, as well as the City's annual 
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expenditure of some public funds to erect and maintain the 
display.  Id. at 1445.  The panel concluded that "the [original] 
display cannot be viewed as anything but a constitutionally 
impermissible dual endorsement of Christianity and 
Judaism."  104 F.3d at 1446.   
 
The panel cited three reasons for rejecting the City's 
argument that the display was not an endorsement of 
Christianity and Judaism but part of the City's year-long 
celebration of its people's many different religious and ethnic 
backgrounds.  104 F.3d at 1446-50.  The panel concluded (a) 
that government endorsement of many different religions 
violated the Establishment Clause, id. at 1447, (b) that a 
reasonable observer, viewing the holiday display, would not 
be aware of the City's other religious and cultural 
celebrations at other times of the year, id. at 1447-49, and (c) 
that the City's policy of celebrating many different religions 
was a quintessential example of government entanglement 
with religion.  Id. at 1449-50.  In reaching the latter 
conclusion regarding entanglement, the prior panel relied 
chiefly on Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).  See 104 
F.3d at 1449-50. 
 
Turning to the modified display, the panel held that the 
District Court's analysis was incorrect.  104 F.3d at 1450-52.  
The panel found  no basis in Supreme Court cases for what 
it termed the District Court's "`demystification' approach," 
and the panel noted that the parties agreed that this 
approach was "flawed."  Id. at 1450-51 & nn. 17-18.  The 
panel "conclude[d] that the district court erred in determining 
that the constitutionality of the modified display depended on 
whether the presence of Frosty and Santa `demystified' the 
creche and the menorah."  Id. at 1451 (footnote omitted).  The 
panel therefore remanded the case for the District Court to 
analyze the modified display pursuant to the proper 
standards.  Id. at 1452.  But while remanding the question 
of the constitutionality of the modified display for 
reconsideration by the District Court, the panel also spent 
several paragraphs expressing in dicta a skeptical view about 
the constitutionality of the modified display.   Id. at 1451-52. 
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On remand, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment 
and a permanent injunction barring the modified display.  
The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment and also 
filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) for relief from the 
District Court's earlier injunction on the ground that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Agostini, which overruled 
Aguilar, had undermined the panel's reasoning.  Specifically, 
the defendants pointed to the panel's reliance on the concept 
of "entanglement" and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Agostini that entanglement should no longer to be considered 
an independent test but should be viewed along with other 
factors as "an aspect of the inquiry into . . . effect." 117 S. Ct. 
at 2015.  
 
Reversing its prior position, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs and held that the 
modified display violated the Constitution.  The Court wrote 
that the panel's "discussion of the context of the display after 
the addition of Frosty the Snowman, Santa and a red sled 
leaves little doubt that it would conclude on the basis of the 
facts in the record before it that even after these additions the 
display communicates the City's endorsement of Christianity 
and Judaism in violation of the Establishment Clause."  The 
District Court also denied the defendants' motion for Rule 
60(b)(5) relief, and the defendants then took this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
We first consider the City's challenge to the denial of its 
Rule 60(b)(5) motion.  Under that rule, a court may relieve a 
party from a final judgment or order when "it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).  A party can show that 
a judgment should no longer have prospective application if 
it can demonstrate "a significant change in either factual 
conditions or the law."  Rufo v. Inmantes of Suffolk County 
Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992).   
 
In Agostini, the Supreme Court modified the Establishment 
Clause test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
612-13 (1971), which asked (1) whether a challenged 
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government practice had a secular purpose, (2) whether its 
principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited religion, and 
(3) whether it created an excessive entanglement of the 
government with religion.  See ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse 
Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The Agostini Court stated that Lemon's entanglement prong 
is best understood and treated "as an aspect of the inquiry 
into a statute's effect."  Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015.  While 
this statement merges the entanglement prong with the effect 
prong, it does not mean that considerations of excessive 
entanglement have been entirely deleted from Establishment 
Clause analysis; in Agostini, the Court analyzed the factors 
regarding entanglement at length.  See id. at 2015-16.  
Rather, the statement appears to mean that entanglement, 
standing alone, will not render an action unconstitutional if 
the action does not have the overall effect of advancing, 
endorsing, or disapproving of religion.  See id. 
 
Since entanglement analysis is still part of the 
Establishment Clause inquiry, the mere fact that the prongs 
have been merged is insufficient to undermine the prior 
panel's decision regarding the original Jersey City display.  
The City and amicus curiae Chabad of Pittsburgh point out, 
however, that the prior panel's entanglement analysis relied 
on two rationales that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Agostini.  First, the prior panel stated that the City's display 
policy would foster excessive interactions between municipal 
officials and local religious leaders in implementing the 
policy.4  104 F.3d at 1449-50.  Second, the prior panel 
reasoned that the City's displays would "produce political 
divisiveness."  Id. at 1450.  The Agostini Court addressed 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The panel asked: "Should a rabbi and a priest be consulted when  
erecting the menorah and the creche?  Should a ceremony accompany  
the erection of these religious symbols?  Should the City employ  
a Muslim cleric during the Ramadan Observance month to avoid  
offending a theological protocol of Islam?"  104 F.3d at 1449  
(footnote omitted). Compare Greater Pittsburgh ACLU v. Allegheny  
County, 842 F.2d 655, 662 (3d Cir. 1988) ("mere placement and  
storage [of religious display] will involve little entanglement"), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).   
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these same two factors in considering the constitutionality of 
New York City's "Title I" program,5 under which public school 
teachers are sent into parochial schools to provide remedial 
education to disadvantaged children, and the Court held that 
these two factors "are insufficient by themselves to create an 
`excessive' entanglement" under its "current understanding 
of the Establishment Clause."  117 S. Ct. at 2015. 
 
While we are inclined to agree with the City and amicus 
curiae Chabad of Pittsburgh that the prior panel's 
entanglement analysis is no longer valid in the wake of 
Agostini, it does not follow that Rule 60(b)(5) relief was 
required.  Before discussing entanglement at all, the prior 
panel concluded that Jersey City's original display violated 
the Establishment Clause because it  "communicate[d] [an] 
endorsement of Christianity and Judaism . . . ." 104 F.3d at 
1446.  If this conclusion is accepted, the original display is 
unconstitutional irrespective of the presence or absence of 
excessive entanglement.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
District Court that Rule 60(b)(5) relief was not required.    
 
III. 
 
We therefore turn to the question of the modified display.  
As noted, the District Court, after initially upholding this 
display, reached the opposite conclusion on remand.  Not 
unreasonably, the District Court interpreted certain 
statements in the prior panel opinion to mean that the panel 
viewed the modified display as constitutionally dubious.   We 
conclude, however, that the statements on which the District 
Court relied were merely dicta, that the prior panel did not 
render a decision regarding the constitutionality of the 
modified display, and that we are therefore obligated to 
analyze that question in accordance with our own best 
independent judgment.6 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79  
Stat. 27 (1965), as modified, 20 U.S.C. S 6301 et seq. (1994). 
6. Our court strives to maintain a consistent body of circuit 
jurisprudence. Thus, "[i]t is the tradition of this court that the  
holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent  
panels" and that "no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a  
published opinion of a previous panel."  Internal Operating  
Procedure 9.1 (emphasis added). Dicta in prior opinions, however,  
are not treated similarly.  On the contrary, we have repeatedly  
held that dicta are not binding.  See, e.g., McGurl v. Trucking 
Employees, 124 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.  
Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1110 (3d Cir. 1996); Bradley v.  
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1071 (3d Cir. 1990).   
Our tradition of treating prior panel decisions as binding  
is closely tied to the rules and procedures regarding rehearing  
en banc.  Rehearing en banc provides the opportunity for 
the full court to correct a panel decision to which the 
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As previously noted, when the modified display was first 
challenged in the District Court, that Court was required to 
rule on an expedited basis, and the Court was therefore 
unable to provide a lengthy, detailed explanation of its 
conclusion that the display satisfied Establishment Clause 
standards.  Instead, the District Court summarily stated that 
by adding additional objects to the original display, the City 
had, in the Court's view, "sufficiently demystified the [holy], 
. . . sufficiently desanctified sacred symbols, and . . . 
sufficiently deconsecrated the sacred."  As both sides 
recognized in the prior appeal and as the panel held, see 104 
F.3d at 1451 & n.18, this analysis did not comport with 
Lynch or Allegheny County and finds no support in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Demystification, 
desanctification, and deconsecration suggest a process of 
profanation, something that the Establishment Clause 
neither demands nor tolerates.  See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
612 (government conduct violates Establishment Clause if its 
primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion). 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
court is unwilling to be bound.  But the standards for rehearing  
en banc look to the panel's decision, not to the panel's dicta.   
See  Fed. R. App. P. 35 (emphasis added) (rehearing in banc may  
be ordered by a court of appeals "to secure or maintain uniformity  
of its decisions . . . .").  LAR 35.1 (emphasis added) (if rehearing  
is sought based on an asserted conflict with prior circuit precedent, 
counsel must certify, "based on a reasoned and studied professional  
judgment, the panel decision is contrary to decisions of the United  
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit . . . and that  
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure and maintain 
uniformity of decisions in this court.").  Thus, panel dicta are  
generally not tested by the availability of en banc review, and  
they are accordingly not entitled to the same binding authority  
that our court has traditionally given to panel decisions.  
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Emphasizing the insufficiency of the District Court's 
"demystification" analysis, the prior panel  "conclude[d] that 
the district court erred in determining that the 
constitutionality of the modified display depended on whether 
the presence of Frosty and Santa `demystified' the creche and 
the menorah."  104 F.3d at 1451.  The panel therefore 
vacated the District Court's modified injunction order and 
remanded the case "so that the district court [could] consider, 
consistent with the standards set forth in [its] opinion, 
whether the modified display was constitutional."  Id. at 
1452.  Since no facts were in dispute, the prior panel itself 
certainly could have ruled on the constitutionality of the 
modified display.  Moreover, since the relevant facts are 
relatively simple and were set out in full detail in the panel's 
opinion, see id. at 1437-38, the prior panel was in just as 
good a position as the District Court to decide that question 
in the first instance. Yet the prior panel chose not to take 
that course, instead remanding for the District Court to make 
that decision.  In light of this remand, it is apparent that the 
prior panel did not foreclose us from ruling on the 
constitutionality of the modified display in accordance with 
our own best independent judgment.  We entirely agree with 
Judge McKee's summary of the majority holding.  In 
concurrence, Judge McKee wrote: 
 
     I think my colleagues' analysis of Lynch and Allegheny 
     establishes that the first display is inconsistent with the 
     prohibitions of Lemon and properly remands to determine 
     the legality of the second display. 
 
104 F.3d at 1453 (emphasis added). 
 
We thus reject the plaintiffs' suggestion that the prior panel 
"formally remanded the issue of the Modified Display to the 
district court" but "in effect already answered the question it 
ostensibly remanded."  Appellees' Br. at 6, 8 (emphasis 
added).  There is no such thing as an ostensible remand, and 
that is not what the prior panel purported to do.  The prior 
panel in fact remanded the question of the constitutionality 
of the modified display, thus leaving the question open and 
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requiring us to decide that question for ourselves.   
 
For these reasons, the dissent's chastisements about 
"evad[ing] the reasoning of [the] prior panel" (Dissent at 42) 
are mistaken.  We have scrupulously followed what is 
"binding" upon us:  the prior panel's "holding" (see IOP 9.1), 
i.e., that the original display was unconstitutional and the 
District Court, in judging the second display, employed 
incorrect standards.  As for the prior panel's comments about 
the modified display, the dissent itself acknowledges that 
these were expressed "in dictum" (Dissent at 42), but the 
dissent would apparently have us follow these non-binding 
statements rather than Supreme Court precedent, viz., Lynch 
and Allegheny County.  This we cannot do. 
 
IV. 
 
The Supreme Court has handed down two decisions 
concerning the constitutionality of municipal holiday 
displays, and therefore it is to these decisions that we must 
primarily look for guidance in evaluating Jersey City's 
modified display.   
 
A.  In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a holiday display erected by 
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island.  "[S]ituated in a park 
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of 
the shopping district," the display was characterized by the 
Court as "essentially like those to be found in hundreds of 
towns or cities across the Nation -- often on public grounds 
-- during the Christmas season."  Id. at 671.  The display 
consisted of "many of the figures and decorations 
traditionally associated with Christmas, including, among 
other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's 
sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout 
figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, 
and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner 
that reads `SEASONS GREETINGS,' and [a] creche."  Id.  All 
components of the display were owned by the City.  Id.  The 
City had purchased the creche some years earlier for $1365, 
and the City incurred a small annual expense in erecting, 
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lighting, and dismantling the creche.  Id. 
 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger analyzed the 
inclusion of the creche in the Pawtucket display under the 
Lemon test and thus inquired whether the inclusion of the 
creche had a secular purpose, whether its principal or 
primary purpose was to advance or inhibit religion, and 
whether it created an excessive entanglement of government 
with religion.  See 465 U.S. at 679.  The Court held that the 
Pawtucket display had a secular purpose, explaining: 
 
     The city . . . has principally taken note of a significant 
     historical religious event long celebrated in the Western 
     World.  The creche in the display depicts the historical 
     origins of the traditional event long recognized as a 
     National Holiday. . . . The display is sponsored by the 
     City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of 
     that Holiday.  These are legitimate secular purposes. 
 
Id. at 680-81 (footnote omitted).  
 
The Court likewise held that the inclusion of the creche did 
not have the principal or primary effect of advancing religion.  
465 U.S. at 681-83.  Noting that prior Establishment Clause 
cases had upheld various forms of aid to students attending 
church-related schools and colleges, tax exemptions for 
church property, Sunday Closing laws,  "release time" 
programs, and legislative prayers, the Court was "unable to 
discern a greater aid to religion deriving from inclusion of the 
creche than from these benefits and endorsements previously 
held not violative of the Establishment Clause."  Id. at 682.  
The Court concluded that if the inclusion of the creche 
provided some "benefit to one faith or religion or to all 
religions," the effect was "indirect, remote and incidental."  Id. 
at 683.  
 
Finally, the Court held that there was no impermissible 
entanglement.  465 U.S. at  683-85.  The Court saw no 
"administrative entanglement" and observed that there was 
"no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning 
the content or design of the exhibit."  Id. at 684.  The Court 
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also noted that the cost of including the creche was small.  
Nor did the Court see a basis for finding an excessive 
entanglement due to political divisiveness.  Id. at 684-85.  
The Court rejected the idea that political divisiveness alone 
could "serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct."  Id. 
at 684.  Observing that the inclusion of the creche had 
produced no marked dissension prior to the lawsuit then 
before it, the Court pointedly wrote that "[a] litigant cannot, 
by the very act of commencing a lawsuit . . . create the 
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of 
entanglement."  Id. at 684-85.7 
 
Justice O'Connor, who joined the opinion of the Court and 
cast the critical fifth vote in favor of the constitutionality of 
the Pawtucket display, wrote a concurring opinion "to suggest 
a clarification of . . . Establishment Clause doctrine."  Id. at 
687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  She pointed out, however, 
that she viewed the Court's opinion as "consistent with" her 
analysis.  Id. 
 
Justice O'Connor wrote that government "can run afoul of 
[the Establishment Clause] in two principal ways": by means 
of an "excessive entanglement with religious institutions" and 
by "government endorsement or disapproval of religion."  465 
U.S. at 687-88.  In the Pawtucket case, Justice O'Connor 
found "no institutional entanglement," and she stated that 
"political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an 
independent test of constitutionality."  Id. at 689.  "The 
central issue in [the] case," she stated, was "whether 
Pawtucket ha[d] endorsed Christianity by its display of the 
creche."  Id. at 690.  "To answer that question," she 
continued, it was necessary to "examine both what Pawtucket 
intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what 
message the city's display actually conveyed."  Id.  She found 
that "Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of 
endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian 
religions."  Id. at 691.  She explained: 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d  
1471, 1486 (3d Cir. 1996) (general summary of Lynch). 
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     The evident purpose of including the creche in the 
     larger display was not promotion of the religious 
     content of the creche but celebration of the public 
     holiday through its traditional symbols.  Celebration 
     of public holidays, which have cultural significance 
     even if they also have religious aspects, is a 
     legitimate secular purpose. 
 
Id.  
 
Justice O'Connor also concluded that Pawtucket's display 
of the creche did not "communicate a message that the 
government intend[ed] to endorse the Christian beliefs 
represented by the creche."  Id. at 692.  She wrote: 
 
     Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance 
     of the creche . . . is not neutralized by the setting, the 
     overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly 
     understand to be the purpose of the display -- as a 
     typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the 
     religious content of a religious painting, negates any 
     message of endorsement of that content.  The display 
     celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends that 
     declaration of that holiday is understood to be an 
     endorsement of religion.  The holiday itself  has very 
     strong secular components and traditions.  Government 
     celebration of the holiday, which is extremely common, 
     generally is not understood to endorse the religious 
     content of the holiday, just as government celebration of 
     Thanksgiving is not so understood.  The creche is a 
     traditional symbol of the holiday that is very commonly 
     displayed along with purely secular symbols, as it was in 
     Pawtucket. 
 
Id. 
 
Four Justices -- Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens -- dissented, concluding that the Pawtucket 
display did not have a secular purpose, 465 U.S. at 698-701 
(Brennan, J., dissenting), had the primary effect of placing 
"the government's imprimatur of approval on the particular 
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religious beliefs exemplified by the creche," id. at 701, and 
"pose[d] a significant threat of fostering `excessive 
entanglement.'" Id. at 702. 
 
B.  The Supreme Court's second decision concerning 
holiday displays came five years later in County of Allegheny 
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), aff'g in part 
and rev'g in part, Greater Pittsburgh ACLU v. Allegheny 
County, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1988).  At issue were two 
displays on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.  The 
first was situated on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny 
County Courthouse, a spot described as the "most public" 
and "most beautiful" part of that building.  492 U.S. at 579.  
This display consisted of a creche, a banner proclaiming 
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" ("Glory to God in the highest!"), some 
poinsettias, a "small" decorated evergreen, and a plaque 
stating that the display had been donated by the Holy Name 
Society, a Roman Catholic group.  Id. at 580.  "No figures of 
Santa Claus or other decorations appeared on the Grand 
Staircase."  Id. at 580-81.  (A picture of this display appears 
at 492 U.S. at 622, Appendix A.) 
 
Five Justices -- the four Lynch dissenters plus Justice 
O'Connor -- held that this display violated the Establishment 
Clause.  Writing for the Court with respect to this issue, see 
492 U.S. at 588-92, Justice Blackmun took pains to 
distinguish the Allegheny County Courthouse display from 
the display upheld in Lynch.  "[U]nlike in Lynch," he wrote, 
"nothing in the context of the display detracts from the 
creche's religious message."  Id. at 598.  He noted that the 
creche stood "alone" as "the single element of the display on 
the Grand Staircase" and that "[t]he presence of Santas or 
other Christmas decorations elsewhere" in the courthouse 
"fail[ed] to negate the endorsement effect of the creche."  Id. 
at 598-99 & n. 48.  Justice Blackmun rejected the suggestion 
that the "floral decoration surrounding the creche" could "be 
viewed as somehow equivalent to the secular symbols in the 
overall Lynch display."  Id. at 599.  He concluded: 
     In sum, Lynch teaches that government may celebrate 
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     Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way  
     that endorses Christian doctrine.  Here, Allegheny  
     County has transgressed this line.  It has chosen to  
     celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of  
     endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for  
     the birth of Jesus Christ.  Under Lynch, and the rest of  
     our cases, nothing more is required to demonstrate a  
     violation of the Establishment Clause.  The display of the  
     creche in this context, therefore, must be permanently  
     enjoined. 
 
Id. at 601-02. 
 
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor similarly 
distinguished Lynch,  stating that "[i]n contrast to the creche 
in Lynch, which was displayed in a private park in the city's 
commercial district as part of a broader display of traditional 
secular symbols of the holiday season, this creche st[ood] 
alone in the county courthouse" and had the 
"unconstitutional effect of conveying a government 
endorsement of Christianity."  492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).  Three of the Lynch dissenters -- Brennan,  
Marshall and Stevens -- were of the view that the display of 
religious symbols on government property necessarily sends 
a messsage favoring religion.  492 U.S. at 637-46 (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-55 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In an 
opinion by Justice Kennedy, four Justices dissented and 
would have upheld the courthouse display.  492 U.S. at 655-79. 
 
A splintered majority of the Court reached a different 
conclusion concerning the second display at issue in 
Allegheny County, which was located in front of the City- 
County Building.  (A picture of this display appears at 492 
U.S. at 622, Appendix B.)  The City's portion of this building 
houses its "principal offices, including the mayor's," 492 U.S. 
at 581, and is thus the functional equivalent of a city hall.  
This second display included three elements:  a decorated 45- 
foot Christmas tree;  an 18-foot menorah that was owned by 
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Chabad, a Jewish group, but was stored, erected, and 
removed each year by the City; and a sign stating: "During 
this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.  Let 
these festive lights remind us that we are keepers of the flame 
of liberty and our legacy of freedom."  Id. at 582, 587. 
 
Six Justices concluded that this display was constitutional, 
but they set out their views in three separate opinions.  First, 
four Justices approved Justice Kennedy's opinion, which 
concluded that both Pittsburgh displays satisfied the 
Establishment Clause.   Justice Kennedy concluded that 
these displays did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because they were noncoercive and did not give direct benefit 
to religion in such a degree that they established or tended to 
establish religion.  492 U.S. at 659, 663-667 (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.).  He noted that it is indisputable that 
government may participate in celebrating holidays with 
religious origins, and he added that requiring government to 
refrain from any use of religious symbols in connection with 
these celebrations would convey a message of hostility to 
religion.  He wrote: 
 
     If government is to participate in its citizens' celebration 
     of a holiday that contains both a secular and religious 
     component, enforced recognition of only the secular 
     aspect would signify the callous indifference toward 
     religious faith that our cases and traditions do not 
     require . . . . 
 Id. at 664. 
 
Second, Justice Blackmun addressed the City-County 
Building display in Part VI of his opinion, which was not 
endorsed by any other member of the Court.  492 U.S. at 
613-21 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  Justice Blackmun 
concluded that this display represented a celebration by the 
city of "both Christmas and Chanukah as secular holidays."  
Id. at 615.  He interpreted the display to mean that "both 
Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday 
season, which has attained a secular status in our society."  
Id. at 616.  He noted that the tallest object in the display, the 
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tree, is a secular symbol, and while he recognized that the 
menorah is a religious symbol, he suggested that it did not in 
context convey a religious message because of the proximity 
of the larger tree and the fact that, in his view, there was no 
comparable secular symbol of Chanukah that the City could 
have used.  Id. at 616-18.  He was fortified in this view by the 
mayor's sign, which saluted liberty and drew "upon the 
theme of light . . . common to both Chanukah and Christmas 
as winter festivals . . . ."  Id. at 619. 
 
Third, Justice O'Connor concluded in a separate 
concurrence that the "combined holiday display of a 
Chanukah menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting 
liberty d[id] not have the effect of conveying an endorsement 
of religion."  Id. at 632.  She agreed with Justice Blackmun 
that the Christmas tree is a secular symbol, but she felt that 
Justice Blackmun's analysis "obscure[d] the religious nature 
of the menorah and the holiday of Chanukah."  Id. at 633.  
She viewed "the relevant question for Establishment Clause 
purposes" as "whether the city of Pittsburgh's display of the 
menorah, the religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to 
a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty sen[t] a message 
of government endorsement of Judaism or whether it sen[t] 
a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own 
beliefs."  Id. at 634.  She opined that the latter, secular 
message was the one that the display conveyed: 
 
     By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree -- a 
     secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season -- with 
     a salute to liberty, and by adding a religious symbol from 
     a Jewish holiday celebrated at roughly the same time of 
     year, . . . the city did not endorse Judaism or religion in 
     general, but rather conveyed a message of pluralism and 
     freedom of belief during the holiday season.   
 
Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 Justice O'Connor rejected the suggestion that the display 
conveyed "a message that endorses religion over nonreligion," 
observing that "[a] reasonable observer would . . . appreciate 
that the combined display [was] an effort to acknowledge the 
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cultural diversity of our country and to convey tolerance of 
different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by 
recognizing that the winter holiday season is celebrated in 
diverse ways by our citizens."   Id. at 635-36.9  
 
Because of the splintered majority in Allegheny County with 
respect to the constitutionality of the display in front of the 
City-County Building, we must employ the standard set out 
in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), in order to 
identify the Court's holding.  Specifically, we must examine 
the positions taken by the Justices needed to form a majority 
and follow the opinion that supports the majority position on 
the narrowest grounds.  See Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
972 F.2d 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1992); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693-94 
(3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992).  
 
In the case of Allegheny County, Justice O'Connor's opinion 
sets out the position that we must follow.  In order to be 
sustained, a display would have to satisfy, at a minimum, the 
standards set out in Justice Kennedy's opinion, which was 
approved by three other Justices, as well as the standards set 
out in Justice O'Connor's opinion.  Although Justice 
Blackmun also voted to sustain the display at the City- 
County Building, his position seemingly imposes more 
formidable standards, and a display would not have to meet 
those standards in order to survive.  Accordingly, in 
considering how the modified Jersey City display now before 
us fares under Allegheny County, we will focus on Justice 
O'Connor's opinion.  Before doing that, however, we will first 
test the modified Jersey City display against the teachings of 
Lynch. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486-87 (general summary of  
Allegheny County). 
9. The three dissenters -- Brennan, Marshall and Stevens -- held the  
same view of the scene in front of City Hall as they did of the creche 
on the great staircase.  492 U.S. at 637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring  
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring  
in part and dissenting in part). 
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The display that the Supreme Court sustained in Lynch 
resembles the modified Jersey City display in several 
important respects.  Both included one or more religious 
symbols owned by the city (in Lynch, a creche; in Jersey City, 
a creche and a menorah), as well as a variety of secular ones.  
Both included one or more secular signs or banners (in 
Lynch, a banner proclaiming "SEASONS GREETINGS"; in 
Jersey City, two signs that read: "Through this display and 
others throughout the year, the City of Jersey City is pleased 
to celebrate the diverse cultural and ethnic heritages of its 
peoples.").  Accordingly, Lynch appears to support the 
constitutionality of the modified Jersey City display unless 
some constitutionally significant distinction can be shown. 
 
One potentially important difference is that the display in 
Pawtucket was located on private property in the center of 
the city's business district, whereas the Jersey City display 
was situated in front of City Hall on public land.  In Lynch, 
neither the opinion of the Court nor Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence seemed to attribute constitutional significance 
to this fact.  (The opinion of the Court noted the fact in 
passing at the beginning of the opinion, 465 U.S. at 671, and 
Justice O'Connor did not mention this fact at all.)  However, 
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Allegheny seemed to place 
greater emphasis on this aspect of the Pawtucket display, 
492 U.S. at 623, 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and 
therefore we will discuss this potentially significant 
distinction in connection with our discussion of Allegheny 
County.   
 
With the possible exception of this factor, however, we see 
no reasonable basis for distinguishing the modified Jersey 
City display from the display upheld in Lynch.  The plaintiffs 
and our dissenting colleague suggest that the cases can be 
distinguished on the ground that in the modified Jersey City 
display "Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman clearly do not 
constitute separate focal points or centers of attention 
coequal with the Menorah and the Nativity Scene," Appellees' 
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Br. at 14, but we see no basis for this distinction.  
Appendices A and B to this opinion, which depict the 
modified displays on both sides of City Hall in Jersey City, 
speak for themselves.  In the modified display on the right, 
the sleigh is just as much a focal point as the figures in the 
nativity scene.  And in the modified display on the left, the 
tree is just as much a focal point as the menorah.10   
 
The dissent attempts to distinguish the modified Jersey 
City display from the display in Lynch on the ground that 
"the Jersey City display had more and larger sectarian 
symbols combined with fewer secular symbols."  Dissent at 
35.  What the record shows, however, is the following.   
With respect to the size of the religious symbols in the two 
displays, the nativity-scene figures in the Jersey City display, 
which ranged from 12 inches to 27 inches in height, were not 
larger than those in the Lynch display, which ranged in 
height from five inches to five feet.  465 U.S. at 671.  Nor 
were there more figures in the Jersey City nativity scene than 
in the Pawtucket scene, which contained figures of "the 
Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, 
and animals."  465 U.S. at 671.  Thus, the dissent's point 
boils down to this:  the Jersey City display differed from the 
Lynch display in that it included a large menorah and a 
smaller number of secular symbols.  But any suggestion that 
these factors are dispositive for Establishment Clause 
purposes is belied by the Supreme Court's holding in 
Allegheny County that the display of a large menorah and one 
secular symbol, a Christmas tree, in front of the City-County 
Building in Pittsburgh was constitutional.  
 
It is interesting that the plaintiffs deride some of the very 
distinctions that the dissent finds so significant.  See 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The plaintiffs' reference to "separate focal points" was derived  
from Justice Blackmun's  discussion of the display of the creche on  
the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse in Allegheny County.  
Writing for the Court in this portion of his opinion, Justice Blackmun  
contrasted this display, in which the creche "st[ood] alone" as "the  
single element of the display on the Grand Staircase," with the  
Pawtucket display, in which each of the secular figures "had its  
own focal point."  492 U.S. at 598.  
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Appellees' Br. at 15 (the court should not "engage in the 
fruitless exercise of determining, figuratively, `how many 
candy canes offset one Jesus?' . . . .  There is simply no 
common currency or rate of exchange by which religious and 
secular symbols can be traded and offset.").  Instead, the 
plaintiffs stress the District Court's observation on remand 
that Jersey City's addition of the secular symbols was "a ploy 
designed to permit continued display of the religious 
symbols."  The suggestion seems to be that, even if Jersey 
City could have properly erected the modified display in the 
first place, the City's initial display, which was held to violate 
the Establishment Clause, showed that the city officials were 
motivated by a desire to evade constitutional requirements 
and that this motivation required invalidation of the modified 
display.  Asked during oral argument whether this meant 
that Jersey City might be precluded from erecting a display 
identical to one that would be permissible in other nearby 
cities, counsel for the plaintiffs insisted that Jersey City's 
"prior history" would have to be taken into account, at least 
until the time came when it could be considered to be 
"purged" of the "prior constitutional taint."  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
27. 
 
We reject this argument.  The mere fact that Jersey City's 
first display was held to violate the Establishment Clause is 
plainly insufficient to show that the second display lacked "a 
secular legislative purpose," see Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 
or that it was "intend[ed] to convey a message of endorsement 
or disapproval of religion."  Lynch, 465 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring).  As our prior discussion of Lynch and Allegheny 
County illustrates, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding 
holiday displays have been marked by fine line-drawing, and 
therefore it is not easy to determine whether particular 
displays satisfy the Court's standards.  Under these 
circumstances, the mere fact that city officials miscalculate 
and approve a display that is found by the federal courts to 
 
                                         23 
 
 
cross over the line is hardly proof of the officials' bad faith.11  
Although the original Jersey City display was ultimately 
struck down, no Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent 
clearly established that it was unconstitutional until the prior 
panel handed down its decision, and therefore the city 
officials' decision to continue to erect that display, which had 
been put up for decades, can hardly be viewed as evidence of 
an intent to flout the Establishment Clause.12 
 
We now consider how the modified Jersey City display fares 
under the holding of the Supreme Court in Allegheny County.  
The Court's decision striking down the display of the creche 
on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse 
does not cast doubt on the constitutionality of the modified 
Jersey City display.  As noted earlier, the display on the 
Grand Staircase consisted of a creche with a religious 
proclamation ("Gloria in Excelsis Deo") surrounded by a floral 
decoration that "serve[d] only to draw one's attention" to the 
creche.  492 U.S. at 598-99.  The display contained no 
secular symbols, and the display did not communicate to a 
reasonable observer the sort of secular message that is 
needed to pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, e.g., 
acknowledgment of "the cultural diversity of our country" and 
support for "tolerance of different choices in matters of 
religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter 
holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens."  
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  
The modified Jersey City display expressly conveyed this very 
message by means of its sign and implicitly conveyed the 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
11. If reaching the erroneous conclusion that a particular display is 
constitutional is regarded as proof of an intent to flout the 
Establishment Clause, are Allegheny County dissenters implicated by  
virtue of their views? 
12. The plaintiffs' position is also contrary to the Supreme Court's  
treatment of the two displays at issue in Allegheny County.  If the  
plaintiffs' view were correct, the erection of the unconstitutional  
display on the Grand Staircase of the County Courthouse should have  
militated in favor of also striking down the display in front of the  
City-County Building, but a majority of the Supreme Court sustained  
that display, and not one Justice took the position that the  
officials' miscalculation regarding the Grand Staircase tainted  
the decision concerning the City-County Building.   
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same message through its diverse nonverbal elements.  Thus, 
the unconstitutional display on the Grand Staircase of the 
Allegheny County Courthouse is readily distinguishable from 
the modified Jersey City display. 
 
On the other hand, there are instructive parallels between 
the constitutionally permissible display in front of the City- 
County Building  and the modified Jersey City display.  
(Indeed, the photograph of the City-County Building display, 
see  492 U.S. at 622, and the display on the left-side of 
Jersey City's City Hall (see Appendix A of this opinion) are 
virtually identical except for the presence of Santa in the 
latter display).  First, both displays contained both secular 
and religious symbolism.  It is true that the City-County 
Building display included fewer religious symbols (a menorah 
only) than the modified Jersey City display (both a menorah 
on the left side of City Hall and a creche on the right), but the 
City-County Building display also included fewer secular 
symbols, and in both cases the balance seems to have been 
roughly the same.  Moreover, Justice O'Connor's opinion in 
Allegheny County refutes any suggestion that the display of 
a menorah is inherently less likely to create Establishment 
Clause problems than is the display of a creche.  Eschewing 
the suggestion that Chanukah is "a `secular' holiday" or that 
"the menorah has a `secular dimension,"' she pointedly wrote 
that "the menorah is the central religious symbol and ritual 
object of [a] religious holiday."  492 U.S. at 633-34.  She 
similarly rejected the idea that, because "it would be 
implausible for the city to endorse a faith adhered to by a 
minority of the citizenry," inclusion of a menorah in a holiday 
display is less likely than a Christian religious symbol to 
convey a message of government endorsement of religion.  Id. 
at 634.  She wrote that "[a] menorah standing alone at city 
hall may well send such a message to nonadherents, just as 
in this case the creche standing alone at the Allegheny 
County Courthouse sends a message of governmental 
endorsement of Christianity . . . ."  Id.   
 
Second, the strong similarity between the location of the 
City-County Building display (on public land in front of what 
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is in essence Pittsburgh's City Hall) and the location of the 
Jersey City display (on public land in front of City Hall) is 
particularly important in light of our earlier conclusion that 
the only basis on which the Pawtucket display upheld in 
Lynch might potentially be distinguished from the modified 
Jersey City display was that the former display was located 
on private land in the city's business district.  The portion of 
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Allegheny County 
relating to the display on the Grand Staircase suggested that 
this distinction had some significance.13  But when Justice 
O'Connor turned to the display in front of the City-County 
Building -- a location indistinguishable for present purposes 
from the site of the Jersey City display -- she held that the 
display was constitutional.  (The other factors that Justice 
O'Connor stressed in this portion of her Allegheny County 
opinion -- the tree and the sign -- also have close parallels 
here).  This persuades us that the location of the Jersey City 
display on public property in front of City Hall does not in 
itself provide a valid basis for holding the display to be 
unconstitutional.   
 
Moreover, although this factor is not necessary to our 
decision, we are convinced that, in evaluating the message 
conveyed by the modified Jersey City display to a reasonable 
observer, the general scope of Jersey City's practice regarding 
diverse cultural displays and celebrations should be 
considered.  In our en banc decision in ACLU of N.J. v. Black 
Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Ed., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996), we 
held that, in determining whether a government practice 
endorses religion, " `the "history and ubiquity" of a practice is 
relevant because it provides part of the context in which a 
reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged 
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of 
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Justice O'Connor noted that the creche in Lynch had been "displayed  
in a private park in the city's commercial district," and she opined  
that "[t]he display of religious symbols in public areas of core  
government buildings runs a special risk of `mak[ing] religion  
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political  
community.'"  492 U.S. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring (quoting Lynch,  
465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
 
                                         26 
 
 
religion.' "  Id. at 1486 (quoting Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 
at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Capitol Square 
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2455 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("the reasonable observer in 
the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the 
history and context of the community and forum in which the 
religious display appears"; "the knowledge attributed to the 
reasonable observer [cannot] be limited to the information 
gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display").  To the 
extent that the prior panel opinion, see 104 F.3d at 1448-49, 
conflicted with our prior en banc decision in Black Horse 
Pike, the prior en banc decision must of course take 
precedence.   
 
In sum, we are unable to perceive any meaningful 
constitutional distinction between the display at issue here 
and those that the Supreme Court upheld in Lynch and 
Allegheny County.  Reasonably viewed, none of these displays 
conveyed a message of government endorsement of 
Christianity, Judaism, or of religion in general but instead 
"sent a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's 
own beliefs."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring).  If we follow Lynch and Allegheny County, we 
have no alternative but to reverse the permanent injunction 
insofar as it enjoins Jersey City from erecting the modified 
display  "or any substantially similar scene or display in the 
vicinity of the entrance to the City of Jersey City's City Hall."  
Indeed, even if  we were persuaded that the modified display 
itself was unconstitutional, we could not possibly approve an 
injunction against "any substantially similar scene or 
display."  Both the Pawtucket display and the display in front 
of  the City-County Building in Pittsburgh were, at the least,  
"substantially similar" to the modified Jersey City display, 
and consequently the District Court's injunction has the 
obviously improper effect of enjoining displays that are 
identical to ones that have passed the Supreme Court's 
scrutiny. 
 
The dissent's attempt to distinguish the modified Jersey 
City display from the display upheld in Allegheny Court is 
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unpersuasive.  The dissent first observes that in Allegheny 
County the 45' tall Christmas tree "dwarfed the 18' tall 
menorah."  Dissent at 36.  The reader can compare the 
photograph of the display sustained in Allegheny County (see 
492 U.S. at 622) with Appendix A to this opinion (the left side 
of the Jersey City display) and make an independent 
judgment as to whether the two scenes are constitutionally 
distinguishable.  In our view, they are not.  The two 
menorahs are comparable in height (18' tall in Allegheny, 19' 
tall in Jersey City), and although the tree in Pittsburgh 
appears larger than that in Jersey City, it is difficult to 
believe that this difference in height is dispositive. 
 
The dissent next observes that "a display's location informs 
the constitutional analysis" (Dissent at 36), but the dissent 
obscures the fact that the display upheld in Allegheny County 
and the Jersey City display were located in comparable spots:  
on public land in front of the building that housed the 
principal offices of the municipal government.   
 
The dissent notes that "Jersey City used public funds to 
own, erect, and maintain the creche and the menorah."  
Dissent at 37.  But in Allegheny County, the menorah was 
also "stored, erected, and removed each year by the city."  
492 U.S. at 587 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  And in Lynch, the 
city owned, erected, and dismantled the creche.  468 U.S. at 
671.   
 
Finally, the dissent argues that, whereas "a display 
containing only a menorah and a Christmas tree" may be 
constitutional, "when a creche and a menorah are displayed 
together, `the menorah's religious significance is 
emphasized.' " Dissent at 37 (quoting Schundler I, 104 F.3d 
at 1446).  This statement overlooks the fact that the creche 
and menorah were displayed on opposite sides of the City 
Hall Plaza Park.  See Appendix C.  More important, since 
Lynch teaches that display of a creche is not per se 
unconstitutional, and Allegheny County teaches that the 
same is true of a menorah, it is hard to accept the 
proposition that the Establishment Clause is violated when 
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these two symbols are displayed together as part of a holiday 
display that includes secular symbols and is dedicated to the 
celebration of a municipality's cultural diversity. 
 
VI. 
 
Before concluding, we find it necessary to explain why we 
do not agree with some of the prior panel's dicta regarding 
the modified display.  Our central point of disagreement 
concerns the prior panel's suggestion that any inclusion of a 
creche -- but not a menorah -- in a display in front of a 
prominent government building, such as a city hall, is 
incompatible with the Establishment Clause.  The prior panel 
observed: 
 
     Government display of a creche [unlike a menorah] 
     cannot convey a meaning separate from the very act it is 
     meant to portray. A creche depicts the Birth of Christ, 
     the event that lies at the foundation of Christianity.  In 
     Allegheny County, the Court determined that displays 
     containing a creche as a primary focal point, which are 
     situated at the seat of government, are constitutionally 
     impermissible as they convey a message of government 
     endorsement.  This is consistent with Lynch, in which 
     the Court permitted a creche that was part of a display 
     in a private park depicting a "winter wonderland" scene 
     because, in context, there were no external indicia of 
     government endorsement. 
 
104 F.3d at 1451. 
 
We respectfully submit, in part for reasons that we have 
already discussed, that this dicta misinterprets both Lynch 
and Allegheny County.  First, the distinction that is drawn 
between a creche and a menorah necessarily rests on the 
mistaken view that these two symbols differ critically with 
respect to the nature or degree of the religious message that 
they convey.  As we have explained, however, Justice 
O'Connor flatly rejected this suggestion in her pivotal 
Allegheny County opinion.  See 492 U.S. at 633-34 (opinion 
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of O'Connor, J.).  Once it is recognized that a creche and a 
menorah should be regarded as equivalent religious symbols 
for the purpose of analyzing holiday displays, the similarity 
between the constitutionally permissible display in front of 
the City-County Building in Pittsburgh and the modified 
display in front of Jersey City's City Hall becomes apparent. 
 
Second, we cannot agree with the prior panel's suggestion 
that in Lynch "the Court permitted a creche that was part of 
a display in a private park depicting a `winter wonderland' 
scene because, in context, there were no external indicia of 
government endorsement."  104 F.3d at 1451 (emphasis 
added).  As we have noted, in Allegheny County, Justice 
O'Connor, as well as Justice Blackmun, seems to have 
attributed some significance to the fact that the display in 
Lynch was situated on private property in the center of 
Pawtucket's commercial district, but to go further, as the 
prior panel did, and say that the Pawtucket display bore "no 
external indicia of government endorsement" is not correct.  
In Lynch, every Justice, whether in the majority or the 
dissent, agreed that by means of its holiday display the city 
of Pawtucket was endorsing some message.  The Justices 
differed in their interpretation of the message that the display 
conveyed, but they all understood that the message was 
linked to the City -- as the lower court opinions in that case 
made abundantly clear: 
 
     [I]t is difficult to suggest that anyone could have failed to 
     receive a message of government sponsorship after 
     observing Santa Claus ride the city fire engine to the 
     park to join with the mayor of Pawtucket in inaugurating 
     the holiday season by turning on the lights of the city- 
     owned display.  See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 
     1150, 1156 (RI 1981).  Indeed, the District Court in 
     Lynch found that `people might  reasonably mistake the 
     Park for public property,' and rejected as `frivolous' the 
     suggestion that the display was not directly associated 
     with the city.  Id., at 1176, and n. 35.   
 
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 666-67 (opinion of Kennedy, 
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J.).  Once these two points are recognized -- that the 
menorah and the creche must be viewed for present purposes 
as equivalent religious symbols and that the display in Lynch 
indisputably involved the conveyance of a government 
message -- the foundation of the prior panel's dicta is 
undermined.   
 
VII. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the District 
Court insofar as it denied the defendants' motion under Rule 
60(b)(5) for relief from the Court's previous judgment.  
However, we reverse the District Court's order insofar as it 
disposed of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment 
with respect to the modified display and insofar as it enjoined 
the defendants from erecting that or any substantially similar 
display.  We remand the case to the District Court with 
instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.  Dissenting. 
 
I have two reasons for dissenting.  First, I dissent because 
I believe that the argument urged upon us by appellant 
undermines our earlier decision in this case.  Following 
Schundler I, addressing the original display, I still conclude 
that the addition of a few small token secular objects is not 
enough to constitutionally legitimate the modified display.  
Although appellant strives mightily to explain what we did 
not hold in Schundler I, I believe it more important to 
determine what we did hold.  We explicitly held that the 
display at issue here, minus Frosty, Santa, the sleigh, and 
the Kwanzaa symbols, was unconstitutional because it had 
the effect of communicating an endorsement of particular 
religions.  So, I submit that the real question now is whether 
simply adding Kwanzaa symbols to the tree and placing 
Frosty (a secular symbol of Christmas), Santa (a once- 
religious symbol -- St. Nicholas -- now quite secularized), 
and a sleigh in the display sufficiently changed the display's 
context so as to negate the message that was conveyed by the 
original display, which we held unconstitutional. 
 
The second, albeit weaker, reason why I dissent is that 
although the majority cites the applicable Supreme Court 
case law to reach its conclusion that this display is 
constitutional, parsing the same law and applying it to these 
facts leads me to the opposite conclusion.  There is, I readily 
acknowledge, much confusion and plenty of room for 
jurisprudential disagreement in this area.  No bright lines of 
demarcation have been drawn between religious 
"establishment" and simple display, and perhaps none of us 
is capable of accurately drawing such a line given the state of 
the case-law.  I am afraid that the shifting majorities and 
fact-specific opinions of the Supreme Court in Lynch and 
Allegheny County provide only a precarious analytical 
framework for both the public and we inferior federal courts 
to apply in determining the exact location of the line of 
demarcation. 
 
The Supreme Court's two major recent excursions into this 
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area have resulted in fractured majorities and no clear 
statement of the law.  Nonetheless, it seems to me that the 
Court has directed us to evaluate religious symbols in the 
context of the entire display.  As we noted in Schundler I, "the 
Supreme Court, in its myriad of approaches in the display 
cases, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
examining the context of the display at issue to determine 
whether it has the effect of endorsing religion."  Schundler I, 
104 F.3d at 1451.  We reaffirmed the significance of context 
when we examined Allegheny County and Lynch "to illustrate 
`the importance of the context of a challenged practice' in 
conducting an Establishment Clause analysis."  Id. (quoting 
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 
1484 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)).  Following the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Lynch and Allegheny County, I conclude 
that Jersey City's modified display resulted in an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion.   
 
A.  Lynch 
 
First, our display is unlike the display that the Supreme 
Court allowed in Lynch.  The majority sees "no reasonable 
basis," other than the different locations of the displays, "for 
distinguishing the modified Jersey City display from the 
display upheld in Lynch."  Majority Opinion at 21.  I believe 
that this analysis of the display fails to adequately credit the 
different contexts of the two displays.  When looked at in its 
context, I believe that the constitutional display in Lynch is 
distinguishable.  The display approved by the Court in Lynch 
included, in addition to a creche (the only religious symbol),  
 
     a Santa Claus house with a live Santa distributing 
     candy; reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh; a live 40-foot 
     Christmas tree strung with lights; statues of carolers in 
     old-fashioned dress; candy-striped poles; a "talking" 
     wishing well; a large banner proclaiming "SEASONS 
     GREETINGS"; a miniature "village" with several houses 
     and a church; and various "cut-out" figures, including 
     those of a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot, and a 
     teddy bear. 
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Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 596, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 
(opinion of Blackmun, J.).  The Court in Allegheny County 
noted that the Lynch display was composed of a series of 
figures and objects, each group of which had its own focal 
point.  See id. at 598, 109 S. Ct. at 3104 (opinion of the 
Court).  The various objects each had a separate "visual story 
to tell."  Id., 109 S. Ct. at 3104. 
 
Contrasting the Lynch display, with its "superabundance 
of secular symbols [which] dilute[d] the message of the 
creche," Amancio v. Town of Somerset, No. Civ.A. 
98CV12810RGS, 1998 WL 846865, *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 23, 
1998) (finding display consisting of a creche, holiday lights, 
a wreath, a Christmas tree, and a plastic Santa Claus 
unconstitutional), with the Jersey City display reveals a 
different context.  Here, rather than a "superabundance" of 
secular objects, only a handful of nonsectarian objects were 
placed in the display, none of which, other than the 
Christmas tree, could have reasonably been considered a 
separate focal point.  I would not underestimate the essential 
importance to the Supreme Court majority of the numerous 
secular objects surrounding the creche in Lynch.  As the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted,  
 
     After Allegheny and Lynch, therefore, not every 
     city-owned-and/or-displayed creche violates the 
     Establishment Clause.  Lynch squarely upheld a city's 
     erection of a creche that it owned as part of its 
     Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit 
     organization.  A key factor leading to that conclusion, 
     especially in light of the later Allegheny decision, was 
     that the creche was only a small part of an otherwise 
     secular display. 
 
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(upholding a holiday display of a creche in light of the 
context) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1186 (1998).  Although I disagree with the Elewski 
opinion in light of Lynch, nonetheless even if we apply its 
reasoning to the Jersey City display, the creche and menorah 
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were certainly not "small parts" of an otherwise secular 
display.  The only reasonable interpretation, as we noted in 
Schundler I, is that Frosty and Santa composed a small 
secular part of an otherwise sectarian display, not the other 
way around. 
 
Rather than the seasonal, "winter wonderland" scene in 
Lynch, Jersey City erected a display that a reasonable 
observer would interpret as having three symbolic focal 
points: the creche, the menorah, and the Christmas tree.1  
The same three focal points that were found to result in an 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion by this Court in 
Schundler I.2  Indeed, the modified display perhaps provides 
a more substantial example of endorsement than the original 
display because the characters of the creche were removed 
from their isolated, sheltered position in the manger to a 
more prominent position beside it.  See Schundler I, 104 F.3d 
at 1439.  Compared to the display in Lynch, the Jersey City 
display had more and larger sectarian symbols combined 
with fewer secular symbols.  This created a different context 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellant argues that because the tree was comparable in size to the  
menorah, it created a separate focal point.  This argument is irrelevant 
in light of our holding in Schundler I.  In that case, we expressly  
held that the presence of the Christmas tree did not make the display  
constitutional. In Schundler I, we determined that the Christmas tree  
had a secular effect, and the mere addition of Kwanzaa ornaments to  
the tree certainly does little to enhance the already secular effect. 
 
In addition, applying a sort of Blackmun yardstick test, appellant  
appears to argue that the 4' tall Santa and the 3'10" tall Frosty  
created separate focal points that operated to neutralize the  
sectarian message conveyed by the 14' tall menorah and the over  
45' square, 7' tall manger with a separate nativity scene.  The  
snowman was located to the back left of the manger, approximately  
35 feet away from the manger.  See App. 48. Santa Claus, on the  
other hand, was located across the walkway, situated between  
the 13' tall tree and the 14' tall menorah.  These token figures  
simply did not substantially detract from the unconstitutional  
sectarian message conveyed by the original display.  See  
Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1452. 
 
2. We also placed a great deal of emphasis on the location of the  
display on the front steps of City Hall in Schundler I.  I will  
follow the majority's lead and discuss this aspect of the case  
when dealing with Allegheny County.  
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and resulted in a different message, one of government 
endorsement of religion. 
 
B.  Allegheny County 
 
Nor do I think that Allegheny County supports the 
conclusion that the Jersey City display was constitutional.  
It can be argued that, when looking at the secular and 
sectarian elements, the balance seems to have been "roughly" 
the same in the Jersey City display and the Allegheny County 
display located on the front steps of the City-County 
Building. I think that statement underestimates the 
importance of the context of the display by eliding the 
difference in the size and location of the various elements.  In 
Allegheny County, the 45' tall Christmas tree was "clearly the 
predominant element in the city's display" on the steps of the 
City-County Building.  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 617, 
109 S. Ct. at 3113 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  The tree 
dwarfed the 18' tall menorah, which was placed to the side of 
the tree's central position beneath the middle archway in 
front of the building.  See id.  This clearly contrasts the 
Allegheny County display with the Jersey City display in 
which, on both sides of the display, the "predominant" 
element was sectarian. 
 
Although not determinative, a display's location informs the 
constitutional analysis.  As Justice O'Connor stated in 
Allegheny County, "[t]he display of religious symbols in public 
areas of core government buildings runs a special risk of 
`mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, 
to status in the political community.' "  492 U.S. at 626, 109 
S. Ct. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 1369 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).  When dealing with the original 
display in the exact same location in Schundler I, we stated, 
 
     When a government chooses to speak by erecting a 
     creche on government property, the principles at the core 
     of the Establishment Clause are clearly implicated.  By 
     erecting the creche itself, on city property, a city sends 
     a stronger message of endorsement of religion than when  
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     it merely provides a forum for private religious speech.   
     In the former context, the government is effectively  
     conveying the message that "we celebrate the holiday  
     season by recognizing the birth of Christ."   
 
Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1445 (citation omitted).  What is 
clear then is that when a display containing religious 
elements is located in front of the main city government 
building, we should recognize that the possibility of sending 
a message of religious endorsement to the reasonable 
observer is augmented.3  
 
We must not overlook an important basis of our decision in 
Schundler I:  In finding the display unconstitutional, we relied 
on the fact that Jersey City used public funds to own, erect, 
and maintain the creche and the menorah.  Although not a 
deciding factor, we noted that "by using taxpayer dollars to 
fund a display containing religious symbols, Jersey City has 
increased the risk that the display's religious message will be 
attributed to the city and its taxpayers."  Id. at 1445-46; see 
also Elewski, 123 F.3d at 57 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) 
(noting that government sponsorship is "a relevant and 
important factor").  The modified display here is subject to 
the same infirmity. 
 
In Allegheny County, the Court allowed a display 
containing only a menorah and a Christmas tree.  We, 
however, have found that when a creche and a menorah are 
displayed together, "the menorah's religious significance is 
emphasized."  Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1446.  In Allegheny 
County, Justice O'Connor found that, even though the 
religious message of the menorah was not entirely 
neutralized, any message of government endorsement was 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Justice O'Connor approved the display in Allegheny County that was  
situated on the steps of a government building.  Since she allowed that  
display, it can be argued that the location of the Jersey City display  
does not in itself provide a valid basis for holding the display to be  
unconstitutional.  Although I agree that this factor alone does not  
justify finding a display to be unconstitutional, it is certainly an  
aspect that should be taken into account when determining the message  
conveyed by the display. 
 
                                         37 
 
 
 
 
 negated by the presence of the much larger Christmas tree.  
See Allegheny County , 492 U.S. at 635, 109 S. Ct. at 3123 
(O'Connor, J, concurring).  In Jersey City, however, the 
religious aspect of the menorah was underscored by the rest 
of the display.4  In this case, the menorah is more reasonably 
viewed in light of the presence of the creche, not the tree.  In 
Allegheny County, the menorah outside the City-County 
Building was privately owned and its religious message was 
not accentuated by the additional presence of a creche 
representing the stable wherein Jesus was born.  These facts 
distinguish the Allegheny County display from this one. 
 
To support its argument that no sectarian message was 
delivered, appellant points to the two signs proclaiming that 
the display was part of a year-round celebration of diversity.  
The value of the signs should be considered in light of, and 
is wholly negated by, the fact that the original display we held 
unconstitutional contained the same sign.  Furthermore, the 
sign clearly states that Jersey City is supporting the display, 
removing any doubt from the reasonable observer's mind 
concerning whether the display was private speech or 
government speech.  Although informative, the mere presence 
of signs stating that the display was part of a celebration of 
ethnic and cultural differences does little to negate the 
impact of the sectarian message.5 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It can be argued that Justice O'Connor's opinion in Allegheny County  
seems to  rebut Justice Blackmun's argument in the same case that a  
menorah is an inherently less religious symbol than a creche.  I  
am not sure I agree with that because when a reasonable observer  
sees a menorah what would she or he think of except the miracle  
of the oil, or of the holy candelabrum in the Jewish Temple, and  
of the Jewish Festival of Lights.  Moreover, although the religious  
impact of a menorah standing alone was debatable, at least by the  
members of the Supreme Court, we have found that the combination  
of a menorah with a creche communicates a clearly sectarian  
message.  See Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1446. 
5. As Justice Blackmun stated, "The simultaneous endorsement of 
Christianity and Judaism is no less constitutionally infirm than the  
endorsement of Christianity alone."  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 615,  
109 S. Ct. at 3112 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) 
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Appellant argues that Schundler I incorrectly determined 
that a reasonable observer would not be aware of Jersey 
City's other celebrations throughout the year.  Assuming 
arguendo that the earlier panel was incorrect, looking at the 
history of this display and others in Jersey City does little to 
save the modified display from its message.  I am not exactly 
sure what a reasonable observer would think.  I doubt, 
however, that he or she would question long why the creche 
and menorah were on the City Hall lawn before concluding 
that it was to celebrate Christmas and Hanukkah.  I also 
think that the reasonable observer, looking at the modified 
display, would be aware of the various ethnic and cultural 
celebrations throughout the year.   In addition, the 
reasonable observer would likely know that no other religious 
celebrations occurred in front of City Hall.  The reasonable 
observer would see that the display is larger than any other 
display in front of City Hall.  The reasonable observer would 
realize that the display was in place longer than any other 
display, secular or sectarian, that occupied the very visible 
space in front of City Hall.6  Finally, the reasonable observer 
would likely remember that for approximately thirty years, 
Jersey City had erected a virtually identical display that we 
found endorsed religion in violation of the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.   
 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
6. From my examination of the record, the only evidence of other  
displays erected by Jersey City in front of City Hall comes from  
the deposition of the mayor, Bret Schundler. 
 
     Q.  Apart from the menorah and the nativity scene, can you recall  
     any other displays erected on the city's initiative that have  
     been erected in front of City Hall? 
 
     A.  I'm sure there have been. 
 
     Q.  Do you have any specific recollections of any examples, as  
     we sit here today? 
 
     A.  We have had memorial week out there, we have flags out there,   
     as you know, which is right in front of City Hall, celebrating  
     every group under the sun. 
 
App. 160. 
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After thirty years of religious promotion by Jersey City in 
front of City Hall, the reasonable observer would likely see 
the addition of the secular figures, which "lacked the physical 
sturdiness and careful positioning of the religious symbols," 
Dist. Ct. at 10, as we saw them in our previous opinion -- 
"token additions" which do little to "secularize" the "conveyed 
. . . message of government endorsement of religion."  
Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1452 & n.19 (noting the "artful[ ]" 
argument of the ACLU that the reasonable observer would no 
doubt characterize the additional figures as "attempts at 
evasion of constitutional prohibitions through superficial 
secular tokenism"); see also Dist. Ct. at 10 (finding that the 
addition of the secular symbols was "a ploy designed to 
permit continued display of the religious symbols"); ACLU v. 
City of Florissant, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1075-76 (E.D. Mo. 
1998) (finding, on similar facts, that adding secular figures to 
a previously sectarian display did not "negate or muffle the 
earlier message of endorsement").  I am aware of no Supreme 
Court holding that allows the government to make a religious 
pronouncement at Christmas and Hanukkah as long as it 
has made a sufficient number of secular pronouncements at 
other times of the year.  Although Jersey City certainly has 
separate ethnic and cultural celebrations, this does not 
obscure the fact that for several weeks of every year, the city 
government erected a display that communicated a religious 
message.  The Supreme Court's interpretation of the First 
Amendment simply does not allow the government to do that. 
 
C.  Lack of Supreme Court Standard 
 
This case, after four years of litigation, underscores what 
I stated earlier about the problems with the standards and 
analyses provided by the Supreme Court in this area.  In the 
course of this litigation, we have twice been asked to evaluate 
the constitutionality of two virtually identical displays.  We 
have come to two directly opposite conclusions.  What has 
resulted is an intra-circuit split in the truest sense of the 
phrase. 
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The inconsistent results in this Court can be directly 
attributed to the insufficient and inconsistent guidance given 
to the inferior federal courts - or, perhaps as I earlier mused, 
the behavior at issue here is incapable of being guided.  In 
both Lynch and Allegheny County, the Supreme Court could 
not agree on the correct analysis, much less the correct 
application of a standard to the facts.  After Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S. 
Ct. 2440 (1995), it now appears that a majority of the 
Supreme Court has at least accepted that government- 
sponsored religious speech should be evaluated under the 
endorsement test.  Until the Supreme Court decides a case in 
which a majority opinion of the Court utilizes a clear test to 
analyze a religious display, we are left with fact-specific 
inquiries that focus on the size, shape, and inferential 
message delivered by displays with religious elements, leaving 
almost any display that has a religious symbol in it open to 
challenge and any such display that has secular elements, no 
matter how trivial, open to judicial approval. 
 
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy's prediction in Allegheny 
County has come true. "[A] jurisprudence of minutiae" relying 
on "little more than intuition and a tape measure" has 
resulted from the unclear analyses contained in the various 
opinions of the Supreme Court.  Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 
at 674-76, 104 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 
D.  Lack of Consistency 
 
Were the foregoing the only reason for my disagreement, I 
may not have written a dissent; or if so, it would may well 
have suffered the same end as most others I write.  However, 
there is  another aspect of this case -- the fact that we have 
already addressed the display at issue here, and that, in my 
opinion, the majority's opinion slices our earlier holding too 
thinly.  As I noted earlier, in light of the holding in Schundler 
I, the only question for us today is whether the additions of 
Santa, Frosty, a sleigh, and some Kwanzaa ribbons 
rehabilitate a display that we held to be an unconstitutional 
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endorsement of religion.  The majority, however, goes beyond 
this issue to question the central holding and reasoning 
underlying an earlier opinion of this Court--a close reading 
of the majority's holding reveals that the decision does not 
only rely on the presence of the figures or the Kwanzaa 
ribbons.  Therefore, the majority would effectively overrule 
one of our own opinions: a task reserved for the en banc 
Court.  Although this event would be cause for alarm in any 
case, my dismay is heightened here where the second opinion 
emanates from the exact litigation as the first.  In this 
instance, the concern for the consistency of the law and the 
legitimacy our jurisprudence is intensified.  Of course the law 
of religious displays is characterized by intensive fact analysis 
and questionable line drawing, and it is possible to disagree 
with our prior holding and analysis; however, to protect the 
integrity of our jurisprudence, I cannot condone the 
appearance of one panel overruling another. 
 
We have the duty not only to review cases and point out 
error, but also to provide guidance.  We cannot ask others to 
respect the integrity of our decisions when we ourselves do 
not; but instead evade the reasoning of a prior panel in the 
same case.  This case is unique in that we have already 
expressed our views on the precise issue and nearly identical 
facts that are the subject of this appeal.  We stated, albeit in 
dictum, when addressing the exact display at issue here, that  
 
     [t]he token additions of the secular symbols do little to 
     alter the "context" or the focal points of the City's 
     display.  We reiterate that Jersey City's display of the 
     creche at the seat of City government power 
     impermissibly conveyed a message of government 
     endorsement of religion.  And, in our view, the City's 
     addition of Santa, Frosty, and a red sled did little to 
     secularize that message.   
 
Schundler I, 104 F.3d at 1451.  Although dictum, the 
language fulfills our responsibility to instruct and guide the 
District Court. 
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On remand, the District Court scrupulously followed our 
instructions and reasoning and determined that the modified 
display violated the Establishment Clause.  The District 
Judge made this determination, even though he may not 
have agreed with it, because he felt duty-bound, in an area 
of law fraught with uncertainty, to follow what he perceived 
to be the instructions we had given him.  Now, reexamining 
the same display almost two years after Schundler I, this 
Court finds that the addition of the figures of Santa and 
Frosty, who was lashed to a tree next to the sleigh, do in fact 
neutralize the unconstitutional message of endorsement that 
had been conveyed by Jersey City for three decades and 
reverses itself concerning the appropriateness of our earlier 
instructions.  This constitutional about-face in the same case 
troubles me greatly, strikes to the core of the legitimacy of 
our jurisprudence, and exposes us to well-earned criticism 
for inconsistency and for giving insufficient respect to an 
earlier instruction by the Court. 
 
E.  Conclusion 
 
I conclude that the message of this display remains the 
same as that of the original display.  On one side, the 
menorah and the Christmas tree tower over the Santa Claus.  
On the other side, a manger, representing the site where 
Jesus was born, dominates the scene.  Next to the manger, 
a cart and a nativity scene reflect the action that myth says 
surrounded the birth of Jesus.  Off to the side is the sleigh, 
and the snowman is placed behind and to the side of the 
scene.  The dominant element of each side of the display is a 
religious symbol.  Looking at the display as a whole, rather 
than focusing on only those elements that were also present 
in the constitutional displays in Lynch or Allegheny County, 
it seems to me that the dominant message of the display is 
an endorsement of religion.  
 
By underestimating the importance of the size, location, 
and number of the secular elements of the display, we have 
now essentially given governments free reign to design their 
religious displays in as sectarian a manner as possible.  In 
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addition, if the government should happen to cross the line 
and convey an unconstitutional message, it needs merely to 
add one or two more token secular figures and try again.  I do 
not think this is the proper message to deliver. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
     Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
     for the Third Circuit 
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